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I
Introduction
India’s performance on the educational sector has not beenimpressive in the post-independence era. Statistics indicatethat India has lagged behind even countries like Sri Lanka.
Empirical studies indicate that the situation is even worse for
Muslims [PROBE 1989; Sengupta and Gazder 1997]. These
studies are supported by NSS figures at the all-India and state
levels [NSS 2001]. As compared to 82.2 per cent literacy level
for India’s urban population, the literacy rate within the Muslim
community is only 66.6 per cent. For West Bengal the cor-
responding percentages are 81.1 per cent and 69.8 per cent,
respectively. Literacy levels can be expected to be even lower
for low income Muslims.
This situation is especially piquant as less than 200 years ago,
Muslims constituted a politically, economically and culturally
dominant section of India’s population. Yet, within the inter-
vening period, they have gradually fallen behind the rest of
society. A low level of education is both a cause and a mani-
festation of this backwardness, specially among low income
Muslims. In such groups, lack of education and overall socio-
economic backwardness has combined to reduce their capability
set; this has resulted in vulnerability and a tendency towards anti-
social and criminal activities. Hence a study of the low incidence
of education amongst Muslims is important in understanding the
reasons for the backwardness of Muslim society.
This paper seeks to examine the nature of educational decisions
among low income Muslims and identify the factors determining
such decisions. It starts with a survey of the alternative expla-
nations of low educational attainment of Muslims. Section III
describes the research methodology and survey areas. Since
educational decisions are dependent on the socio-economic context
in which agents are embedded, the socio-economic and cultural
characteristics of the slums studied are described in detail. This
is followed by the survey results. The value placed on education
and its reasons are examined first; this is followed by enrolment
rates. Expenditure patterns on education are analysed next. In
addition to money costs, the opportunity costs of education –
in the form of foregone income from child labour or foregone
utility of services from the child at home – can be expected to
be an important factor determining education-related decisions.
Section VI discusses this aspect. This is followed by an econometric
analysis to assess the relative importance of factors determining
educational decisions. In the concluding section, the findings are
integrated to identify the causes of low educational attainments
amongst low income Muslims.
II
Low Educational Attainment of Muslims
Studies of inequalities in educational opportunity between
different socio-economic classes emerged as an important re-
search issue in the 1950s [Harnqvist 1978]. Alternative ex-
planations were offered to explain socio-cultural differences in
educational choices. Such explanations have been categorised
by Boudon (1978:22-24) as follows:
(a) Different social classes have different value systems that
influence their attitude towards the benefits of education [Hyman
1953].
(b) The social position theory was developed in reaction to the
value theory.1 This theory argues that members of different social
classes have to travel different 'social distances' to attain the same
educational level. This explanation focuses on the different costs
and benefits of education faced by different social classes.
(c) In addition to the different cost-benefit ratio of education,
the social backgrounds of families generate varied differences
in cultural opportunities. Children of a particular social class
may have to learn values and skills inconsistent with their
family backgrounds. For instance, in their study of working
class children in a north England industrial city, Jackson and
Marsden (1962) report that the teaching of middle class values
in grammar schools created a conflict between the school and
neighbourhood.
These explanations suggest two alternative hypotheses to explain
the educational backwardness of Muslims.
The common explanation offered for the low educational
attainment of Muslims is in terms of the value system characterising
Muslim society. The conservative attitude of Muslim parents,
prevalence of purdah and early marriage, reluctance to send
daughters to school (particularly to co-educational institutions,
and if women teachers are absent), and a preference for religious
education leading to dependence on madrasas have been
identified as important factors in this context [Ansari 1989;
Jehangir 1991; Ruhela 1998; Salamatullah 1994]. In addition,
the focus on educating daughters to become good mothers and
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husbands, their segregation from boys after puberty, early marriage,
costs of dowry, and the realisation that benefits from education
will accrue to the matrimonial home creates a gender bias
[Jehangir 1991; Ruhela 1998; Salamatullah 1994]. This expla-
nation is supported by case studies and statements like “My father,
being an orthodox Muslim, is against providing higher education
to his girls. He considers coeducation as an evil” made by Muslim
girls during interviews [Ruhela 1998:11].
As opposed to this view, it can also be argued that Muslim
parents do realise the value of education. However, the costs and
benefits of education to a Muslim child are different from other
communities. For instance, a large proportion of the Muslim
community belongs to the low-income section. As a result, they
may find it difficult to finance the education of their children.
In addition Muslims may work in insecure jobs with variable
income. The resulting uncertainties may result in a reluctance
to make long-term investments in education. The opportunity
costs of educating children in the form of foregone returns from
child labour or incomplete household choirs may also become
important in this context. Simultaneously, the expected perceived
benefits from education is low due to the tight conditions in the
labour market. Further, Muslims perceive that the labour market
is biased against Muslims; this reduces the already low prob-
ability of securing work.
The cost-benefit analysis may be affected by another process.
Educational systems contain a set of socio-cultural beliefs. These
beliefs may be contradictory to the socio-cultural environment
and the realities of their daily life. For instance, the secular nature
of the educational system may conflict with the attempts of the
family to provide religious training to the children. This may
create tensions and doubts regarding the worth of education. This
effect of this process is to increase the 'social distance' to be
travelled by a Muslim child.
The first hypothesis, therefore, is basically a demand side
explanation that argues that low income Muslims are not inter-
ested in education. In other words, it is the preference pattern
of Muslims themselves that is responsible for the low level of
primary education amongst Muslims. The alternative hypothesis
suggests that Muslims recognise the need for education, but
constraints in the form of factors reducing the actual or perceived
returns to education may prevent the demand for education being
translated into effective demand. This study tries to identify
which of these two hypotheses explains the low educational
attainment of Muslims.
III
Data Sources and Description of Survey Sites
This work is empirical in nature and relies on primary data.
The primary data was collected on the basis of a household survey
of 107 slum dwellers from the Park Circus-Topsia area, in
Kolkata. Park Circus has been selected as the survey site as it
is a commercially developed area with good transport links to
both educational institutions and to places of work (creating an
incentive for dropping out). The Topsia belt, on the other hand,
contains numerous leather and shoe factories; the proximity of
a large labour market can be expected to have a negative impact
on the demand for education. Further, there are slums of different
income levels and cultural groups in these two regions.
The respondents have been drawn from five slum areas.
Each of these areas has their unique features. At this point, it
should be noted that while there was considerable economic
and socio-cultural variations across slums, differences within
slums were negligible. This allowed us to draw relatively small
samples within slums (consisting of 20-25 households per
slum). The slums studied can be divided into three groups
based on the income profile of their inhabitants. The main
demographic and economic characteristics of these slums are
given below (Table 1).
High Income Slums
Slum 1 is in the first category. This slum is located on Karaya
Road, between the Scottish Cemetery and A J C Bose Road. The
inhabitants are migrants from Bihar who have settled in Kolkata
for several generations. Their vernacular is Urdu. The inhabitants
mostly reside in one- (or two-) room ‘bustees’, having a common
water source. The houses are ‘pukka’, but have tiled roofs. The
male members are occupied in the service sector that has emerged
in the adjacent Mullickbazar area. Most of them are motor
mechanics, or work in shops; a few are engaged in the formal
sector.2 Thus the inhabitants are able to earn a fairly high and
stable income. The family size is small, so that per capita income
(Rs 789.90) and standard of living is higher than in other slums.
These families display similar traits to those working class families
observed by Jackson and Marsden (1962) – aggressiveness,
competitiveness, pride in achievements, delight in extension of
their knowledge, and a desire to pick up a new polish for their
manners and accent.3 This spirit is manifested in their educational
choices and can be sensed from the neatness of their rooms, the
attires of male members and children, and their polished speech.
However, such mobility does not mean that they are not religious
minded. They are not fundamentalist, but their attitude is con-
servative and they follow religious practices seriously. Though
only one such slum was surveyed, reports were received of similar
pockets existing in other areas also.
Medium Income Slums
Three medium income slums – in Gorachand Road (behind
Lady Brabourne College), Kasiabagan (to the south of Dilkhusa
Street and west of Bright Street, besides the Muslim Girls Hostel),
and Dhapapara (in Golam Jilani Khan Road, Topsia) – were
surveyed.
These slums are in sharp contrast to Slum 1. Houses – most
of which have been constructed without sanction from the
KMC – are built side-by-side creating a grim concrete jungle.
Some houses are one-storied, with tiled roofs. They are built
around a common courtyard. There are also pukka houses
of 5-6 stories. Though all houses have electricity connections,
Table 1: Demographic and Economic Features of Slums
Label Type Locality Sample Monthly Family Children
Size  Income Size
(Rs)
1 High income Karaya Road 20 3851.75 5.45 1.65
2 Medium /low and
stable income Gorachand Road 17 2931.82 7.12 2.71
3 Kasiabagan 15 3132.13 5.73 1.60
4 Dhapapara 26 2904.12 10.31 3.19
5 Low, fluctuating
income Topsia 24 1790.04 5.88 2.96
– All slums 102 2936.33 7.11 2.52
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there is no running water supply in these areas. Water is not
available in most houses of Kasiabagan and Gorachand Road,
but have to be fetched from KMC taps. In the past few months
even this supply has stopped in Gorachand Road. The only source
of water is by KMC trucks that supply water twice a day. The
situation is better in Dhapapara where there is a common tap
for each storey, or group of houses. The residences are one or
two roomed, extremely dirty and poorly-lit and ventilated. The
family size is large, creating poor living conditions. The residents
have migrated from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, via Kidderpore-
Metia Bruz three-four generations ago. As a result these people
have absorbed the cultures of both West Bengal, and Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh. For instance, these people are bi-lingual, though
residents of Slums 2 and 3 are more conversant in Bengali, and
residents of Slum 4 in Urdu.
In Gorachand Road, there are a large number of small units
preparing shoes interspersed within the locality. In addition, there
are also some tailoring establishments in the locality. Residents
seek work in these units. Monthly income is Rs 2,931.82 – but,
labour demand is contracting in recent months, creating un-
certainties. The residents of Kasiabagan work in stable jobs in
the informal sector. Wages are low, and have to be supplemented
by female members. However, child labour seems negligible. The
survey was undertaken on a Saturday. We observed relatively
few children; these children were either playing or returning from
schools. Family size is smaller in this slum, compared to that
in Slum 2; as a result per capita income here is higher (Rs 607.95
compared to Rs 436.54 in Slum 2).
The proximity of tanneries and rubber shoe factories to
Dhapapara means that the economic conditions of the residents
are closely linked to such units. These factories provide formal
employment to a large proportion of the residents. In addition,
the operation of the factories and tanneries generates demand
for subsidiary services, like petty transportation. This provides
a steady though low flow of income (Rs 2,904.12). In addition,
as we shall see later on, there is a demand for female and child
labour to cut the rubber straps of slippers. This has an important
effect on education related decisions. The average family size
is largest in this slum (7.12 adults and 3.19 children). Thus their
per capita income is even lower that of Slum 5 (Rs 429.78,
compared to Rs 434.51 in Slum 5); their standard of living is,
however, slightly better than that of Slum 5.
Low Income Slum
Slum 5 falls in the low and unstable income category. This
is located on the northern bank of the canal parallel to the Park
Circus Connector. The residents are first generation migrants
from rural areas in West Bengal (mainly the Sundarban area).
Male members do not have a fixed job or occupation. They earn
their wages on a daily basis by working as a daily worker, driver,
or carrying loads – or what ever job they can get. Their monthly
income is about Rs 1,790.04. Their residences are ‘jhupris’:
temporary structures made of bamboo and mud. This was the
only slum without access to electricity. Nor do they have water
supply. Possession of assets was negligible. Only a few had
cycles; none of them had the portable black-and-white TV sets
commonly found in all other slums. Parents lack education and
are culturally backward. Their dominant concern is to survive;
this leads to anti-social activities. The family structure is weak
in this area. Adultery and desertion of wives are common social
problems. Alcoholism and drug addiction is also common in this
area, and generates petty crimes and even violence.
IV
Demand for Primary Education
A common belief is that most Indian parents belonging to the
low-income level are disinterested in their child’s education. This
belief is prevalent even with policy-makers and experts on edu-
cation. It is manifested in statements like “illiterate and semi-
literate parents see no reason to send their children to school”,
or “the vast majority of adult illiterates belonging to the poor
economic stratum are not convinced of it (that literacy is a basic
right of every education)”.4
Perceived Importance
Although empirical research has refuted this claim, it also
reports a gender bias [PROBE 1999]. Most parents expressed
a much stronger interest in their sons’ education rather than their
daughters’ [PROBE 1999:19-20]. Muslim households face the
additional charge of being conservative and alienated from the
mainstream. It is also believed that Muslim parents are at most
interested in educating their male children. This study however
found most Muslim parents expressing an interesting in educating
their children – irrespective of gender. Most of the respondents
felt that education was important for both boys and girls (94.12
per cent). Only 4.07 per cent felt that education was unimportant.5
The PROBE Report [PROBE 1999:20-21] also reports that the
primary motivation for educating their children is economic: it
is anticipated that education will enable the children to get a better
employment opportunities. Contrary to such surveys [Bhatty
1998; PROBE 1999], better employment prospects do not appear
to be the dominant motivating factor amongst the survey group.
Respondents felt that only a very high level of education will
improve job prospects significantly. The low level of education
generally attained by slum dwelling children is not expected to
help them to secure jobs, especially as respondents believe that
there is a bias against Muslims in the job market (both in the
private and public sector). In contrast, respondents emphasised
the utility of basic education or literacy in their daily life. The
ability to read and write helps them read and sign agreements,
understand monetary contracts, perform simple calculations in
the market, keep household accounts, write letters, and undertake
various similar activities that are essential in their daily life.
Improved marriage prospects is also an important factor.
There are some inter-slum variations in motivations. Though
slum dwellers are not motivated by the employment factor in
educating their children in general, there are two exceptions to
this – the Karaya Road (Slum 1) and Kasiabagan (Slum 3) slums.
Table 2: Distribution of Households by Motivations
to Educate Children and Slums
Motives for Educating All Individual Slums
Children Slums 1 2 3 4 5
Better employment 35 17 4 9 5 0
Needed in daily life 65 13 13 8 19 12
Better marriage 21 5 3 1 10 2
Earn respect 14 2 4 5 3 0
Learn English 1 1 0 0 0 0
Others 5 0 0 2 1 2*
Note: * Sending children to school enables them to get free food, medical
check-ups, and medicine.
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The belief that education is necessary in daily life motivates
education decisions in all slums. In the Topsia slum (Slum 4)
improved marriage prospects appears an important incentive.
Education and Marriage Prospects
Literature points out that the effect of education on marriage
prospects may be particularly important with respect to the girl
child [PROBE 1999]. Education can affect marriage both ways.
Education may improve the ability of the girl to get a ‘good’
husband; on the other hand, in communities where education is
not widespread, it may increase the costs of marriage as a larger
dowry has to be paid, or a suitable groom may not be easily
available.
Respondents believed that education would improve their child’s
marriage prospects – but this is treated as a subsidiary benefit
of education, and does not appear to one of the dominant motives
behind the decision to educate daughters or in the choice of school
or medium of instruction. Interviews indicated that it is at the
secondary stage (class V and above) – where most of the dropouts
occur – that considerations of marriage become important. At
this stage, lack of income forces parents to consider whether to
continue education or not. In such situations – in contrast to the
gender bias reported in other studies – they prefer to educate
girls. This can be attributed to the differences in expected returns
from education. At the primary stage, therefore, there does not
appear to be any difference in the enrolment rates between boys
and girls. Nor does there appear to be any discrimination between
sons and daughters with regard to choice of medium of instruc-
tion, type of school, or expenditure on education.
Interestingly, respondents argue that education was more
important for the girl child. Given the nature of the job market
– characterised by a high level of unemployment and a perceived
bias against Muslims – parents do not feel that education will
enable the boy child to get a good job. Expected returns to
educating male children are low. On the other hand, the expected
benefits from educating daughters were high. Unlike in other
communities, it is easier to marry off an educated daughter. The
reason is that in Muslim societies marriages between low edu-
cated males and relatively highly educated females is acceptable;6
furthermore, an educated bride is highly valued as she can educate
her children herself and will be able to keep accounts better. Thus
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the returns to educating daughters are higher. It has been pointed
out that these returns do not accrue to the parents, but to the
family into which the girl marries; this often acts as a disincentive
to educating daughters [PROBE 1999]. However, this approach
considers only economic returns. Muslim parents feel that it is
their duty to marry their daughter into a ‘good’ family. Thus,
they may not derive any economic benefit from educating their
children, but they get some psychological return from adhering
to a social norm and enjoy increased prestige from having a ‘good’
son-in-law.
In addition, parents felt that education would enable their
daughters to be independent after marriage. This would insure her
in the case of desertion by her husband, which is a not uncommon
phenomenon amongst slum dwellers. In many cases, therefore,
parents argued that education was more important for girls.
Enrolment Rates
However, it is not enough to recognise the importance of
education in daily life – is this appreciation manifested in actual
behaviour? The enrolment rate for the families surveyed is 73.15.7
This is quite high.
However, there is some variation in this ratio between slums
(Figure 1). Slum 1 has the highest enrolment ratio; in fact only
one case of a drop out was found. The enrolment ratio is lowest
for the jhupri area (Slum 5) – 61.97. Even this ratio is misleading
as most of the school going children is enrolled in NGO-run
schools, and not in formal educational institutions. Respondents also
reported that the survival rate was low – very few of the children
graduated from the non-formal system to the formal educational
system. In fact, only 9 out of the 39 school going children (23.08
per cent) presently have access to formal education facilities.
Demand for Education in Low
and Fluctuating Income Slums
The disappointing spread of education in the low-income slum
area (Slum 5) is not surprising as educational demand and income
is positively correlated. But there is some difference in opinion
regarding the mechanism through which income operates. Re-
search shows that explanations offered by parents may differ
sharply from that offered by teachers. A study of a low-income
slum in Gandhinagar, New Delhi [Banerjee 1997] is relevant in
this context.
Teachers typically tend to offer the following explanations for
the low enrolment and high dropouts:8
(1) Members of such slums are generally first generation mi-
grants. They retain strong social, economic and kinship ties with
their village of origin. This leads them to return to their villages
for long periods for festivals and family functions, and during
times of distress.
(2) Mothers have to work for long hours. This leads to her absence
from home for the greater part of the day. In the absence of an
extended family there is no one to care for and support children.
In the absence of monitoring of performance children play truant
from school or do not study.
(3) Parents are forced by economic distress to move frequently
from one slum to another. This disrupts the educational career
of their children.
(4) Children have to work either in the labour market to supple-
ment family income or at home to complement or substitute for
mother’s labour (in cooking, supervision of siblings, fetching
water, etc).9
The relevance of these explanations has also been examined
in this study.
(1) Respondents had retained ties with their village of origin. This
led them to move back to their villages for long spells. This had
a disruptive effect on the schooling of their children in some cases.
However, parents also tried to adjust these periods of absenteeism
with school holidays. In some cases respondents reported that
the child had been removed from urban schools and re-admitted
to rural schools. This is an optimal strategy on several counts.
(a) Literature on social security networks shows that relatively
better off families may take care of surplus children in poorer
families [Scott 1976]. Respondents send their children to villages
to be taken care of by their relatives who earn a more stable income.
(b) The main source of education in low-fluctuating income slums
is NGOs. They provide non-formal education for two years and
try to get their students admitted to government-sponsored or KMC
schools. However, the rate of admission to the formal education
system is quite low – especially in relation to their output. The
students who fail to get admitted to the formal education system
are retained within the formal education system by the organi-
sations. Parents, however, may choose to send them to rural areas
where it may be easier to avail of formal educational facilities.
(c) Costs of formal education are lower in rural areas.
Several cases of such ‘dropouts’ where a parent was unable to
continue the education of their children and withdraws them from
the urban schooling system – only to re-admit them in rural
schools – were reported by the jhupri-dwellers. Interestingly, such
children were classified as dropouts by parents.
(2) Women in such slums tend to leave early for work; however,
they also return home early – generally within 1 or 2 pm. This
allows them to supervise study at home [Banerjee 1997]. In
support of this proposition, it found that in 60.22 per cent of
the surveyed families the mother was the sole supervisor of the
education of the children.10 While Banerjee’s point is not invalid
that some qualifications are perhaps necessary.
(a) All the houses are one-roomed jhupris. As a result the activities
of the parents may prevent serious study. Alcoholism, drug-
addiction and related disturbances may pose constraints. Even
harmless activities like listening to the radio may affect concen-
tration as it takes place within the same room.
(b) Children are imparted religious instructions in the late evening.
This implies that the only period in which the child can be
monitored is not utilised on preparing for the formal or non-
formal education system.
(c) Many children have to supplement family income at home.
This reduces time for studies.
(d) Girls have to take additional household responsibilities during
the pregnancy of their mothers, leading to their dropouts. This
Table 3: Composition of Monthly Expenditure on Education
Monthly School Fees NSS (1998) Survey Findings
India West Bengal Absolute Relative
(Rupees) (Rupees)  (Rupees)  (Per Cent)
Tuition fees 76.25 70.92 84.05 35.17
Books and stationery 20.58 41.42 45.40 19.00
Private tuition 48.42 115.58 66.45 27.81
Uniform costs 25.75 21.50 33.18 13.88
Misc expenses 7.83 7.42 – –
Daily transport costs 68.42 53.92 9.89 4.14
Total money costs 247.25 310.75 238.98 100.00
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is a serious problem in slums where fecundity is high, so that
conceptions are frequent and there are siblings too young to be
left alone.
(e) During the survey, even in the evening, about 25 per cent
of the houses were found to be locked up, as both parents were
absent. In these families even the mother works for long hours.11
A study of the educational performance of children of such
households is interesting and likely to reveal a trend different
from what was observed for the rest of the slum. However,
practical problems prevented us from interviewing these parents
in the late evening.
(3) Movement from one slum to another is constrained by the
availability of contacts and space in slums. As a result there does
not appear to be changes in the population of slums except for
in-migration from rural areas. This explanation is thus not valid
in the slum studied.
(4) The extent to which child labour is a constraint is examined
later on in details.
It was found that NGOs were running three schools in the area.
These programmes relied on providing highly subsidised non-
formal education and incentives like free medical check ups,
medicine (in case of illness) and nutritious food to attract
children.12 However, these schools did not provide any alter-
native source of income to compensate for any loss in income
from child labour. The success of these schools, in spite of this,
challenges the proposition that the practice of child labour
constrains the spread of education amongst low-income slums.
Identity of Decision-Maker
The nature of education-related decisions, specially the re-
ported absence of gender bias, depends on the identity of the
decision-maker. Research on decision-making in Muslim families
indicate that, despite the dominance of Muslim males, the domestic
domain belongs to the female, and the tasks she performs there
are by right exclusive to her [Utas 1983]. Within this limited
sphere she is accorded respect and enjoys considerable power,
stemming from the valuation placed on the role of mother and
wife in Muslim communities. In controlling this domain, the
Muslim woman also controls its inhabitants – including men.
This control is manifested in her relation with her children and
her husband. This survey found that in 60 per cent of the families,
the mother took decisions, while in 8 per cent families both parents
played a role. This occurred despite the fact that the mothers was
at most barely literate or had completed primary education.13
The reason lies in the basic rhythm of the life of Muslims. The
mother is the organic centre of household activities. She is the
parent who is mostly present at home and able to observe the
children. Interestingly, it was observed that the enrolment rates
of children are slightly higher in families where the mother has
the dominant role (0.88 compared to 0.80). This difference,
however, is not statistically different.
V
Expenditure on Education
The family income allocated on education by the slum dwellers
is quite high – Rs 412.69 per month. This constitutes 12 per cent
of income. Further, both the absolute level of expenditure on
education and its proportion to income tends to vary with income
– it is highest for Slum 1 and lowest for Slum 5.
It can be seen that the main item of expenditure is tuition
fees. This indicates that slum dwellers are either not accessing
or being able to access subsidised education. Expenditure on
private coaching of children is also high – indicating the interest
of children in educating their children. Purchase of books and
stationary also forms an important component of the education
budget.
The survey results has been contrasted with all-India/West
Bengal figures. Tuition fees, expenditure on books and stationary,
and uniform costs are higher in the survey; this may be caused
by inflation. Expenditure on private tution is lower than figures
for West Bengal, though higher than all-India levels.
The most important difference that emerges from this com-
parison is the low transport costs. The reason is that parents in
all slums choose schools on the basis of their proximity to their
homes, so that children generally walk to their schools. Students
of class 3 to 5 can walk to school alone, or in groups – taking
their younger siblings with them. However, younger children
(particularly those studying in class 2 or below, and those with
siblings studying in other schools) have to be taken to or brought
back from their schools by their parents. This creates a time cost
in the form of a sacrifice of leisure or work hours. It has been
seen that while children may be taken to school by both parents,
it is generally the mother who brings them back. The time spent
on this activity has also been estimated. Averaged over the 33
households who incur this cost, the time spent on taking the child
to school and bringing him/her back turns out to be 45 minutes
per day.15 This cost has led to an interesting practice. Some
relatively well-off families hire a person (generally a female of
the locality) to fetch their children. Such persons may earn as
much as Rs 200 per month for this job.
Slumwise Variations in Expenditure
Differences in demographic and economic characteristics of
the slums may generate differences in the expenditure pattern.
It can be seen that income levels and expenditure on education
are positively correlated.
Expenditure on education is highest for the high-income slum
(Slum 1). This is because parents focus on the quality of education
being provided by schools in this slum. The Veblen effect operates
– leading to a preference towards private English-medium schools.
This leads to high levels of expenditure on school fees, as well as
on associated items like uniform, and books and stationery. During
surveys in other slums, guides reported similar pockets. For in-
stance, in the Topsia area, a small enclave of relatively high-income
slum dwellers with the same cultural characteristics of Slum 1,
educate their children in the nearby Goh Cheong Ling School.
Table 4: Composition of Monthly Expenditure on Education
Per Capita – by Slums
(Rs)
Item Slum 1 Slum 2 Slum 3 Slum 4 Slum 5
School fees 235.17 19.35 124.33 43.85 1.58
Books, etc 101.65 48.21 40.36 30.40 8.58
Private tuition 115.67 83.22 88.93 51.46 6.92
Transport - - 42.86 13.33 -
Uniform 81.40 25.96 33.90 24.33 0.49
Total 533.88 176.74 330.27 163.37 17.58
No of children 1.65 2.71 1.50 3.19 2.96
Education budget 710.75 395.73 407.64 317.12 33.79
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In medium-income slums, parents are interested in minimising
costs. This leads them to prefer government-aided schools. There
does not appear to be any bias towards Urdu-medium education;
mainly Bengali medium schools are chosen. Consequently,
expenditure on school fees, uniform and books and stationery
is low in these slums. Slum 3 is an exception. High- and middle-
class households surround this slum; several middle-income
households live within the slums. This has possibly created a
demonstration effect, leading to a demand pattern inconsistent
with their income levels.
The economic features and hence pattern of demand for education
is totally different in the jhupris of Slum 5. Here, parents are
unable to afford the expenses of formal education system; they
are forced to seek subsidised sources of education – in the NGO
run schools in the vicinity. Consequently, the proportion of
income spent on education is very low.
VI
Opportunity Costs of Education
Another important component of costs of education is the
opportunity cost of education. This consists of earnings from
sending the child to work and using the child to perform house-
hold work.
Literature on Child Labour
The ILO data from 1998 estimates that there are 0.25 billion
child workers aged between 5-14 years, of whom half are full
time workers. South Asia contains the largest number of such
children (54 million). This is commonly explained in terms of
poverty and the limited options open to children belonging to
families at the edge of survival. A study of child workers in the
match and fireworks industries in south India noted that in the
absence of child labour, more than 50 per cent of the households
surveyed would lose a substantial portion of their income.16
Researchers have pointed out the crucial importance of children’s
income in tiding over seasonal crises in families not engaged
in secure or regular jobs.17 It is also argued that children are sent
to work at an early age to develop skills,18 or cultivate networks
with future employers. In areas where there is a high incidence
of adult unemployment, child labour may be a substitute for adult
labour.19 On the other hand child labour may be used in family
enterprises releasing adult labour to seek work in the labour
market. Weiner (1991) argues that a large proportion of such
children join the work force at an early age, thereby, losing any
chance of receiving education.20
On the other hand there is an alternative school of thought that
downplays the contribution of children to household income
[Swaminathan 1998]. Economic activities of children are viewed
as ‘default activities’ [Bhatty 1998] arising from inadequacy or
non-availability of schools, leaving children little options but to
help at home or work. This enables NGOs to send children to schools
without providing any substitute economic incentive [Sinha 2000].
This is supported by NSS data [NSS 1997]. Analysing the reasons
for non-attendance and dropouts NSS found that 21-30 per cent
of the children was not interested in education, and 15-20 per
cent could not afford to bear the costs. Only 6-10 per cent of the
children were working or engaged in household chores (3-4 per
cent girls and 1-2 per cent boys) [NSS 1997:19].
Some writers have also challenged the view that the household
faces a polarised choice between sending the child to school or
to work. In some cases, there may be an intersection between
the two activities. Children may work in order to free resources
for investment in their education.21 The combination of schooling
and working may also be viewed as a strategic choice to balance
the benefits of a minimum education with the benefits of learning
skills or cultivating contacts in the job market.
Incidence of Dropouts and Opportunity Cost
In this survey dropouts and non-enrolment were estimated
together. Out of 249 children, 69 are not currently enrolled; of
these 41 are boys and 28 girls. Most of these are in Slum 4. The
slumwise variations in dropouts are given in Table 5.
No distinction was made between ‘never enrolled children’ and
‘dropouts’ in this study. However, most of these children had
been enrolled at some point of time. Most of the dropouts are
due to the inability of parents in raising the necessary funds to
educate their children. There are three NGOs working in Slum 5
providing free education to slum children. But parents do not
seem to be aware of this: they are ignorant of the admission
criterion and procedure. Poor results and disinterest of the student
in studies was another reason. Only seven children left school
because they had found work.
The child withdrawn from school is not immediately sent to
the labour market. In most cases of disinterested children, the
child was withdrawn within a few months of schooling. In other
cases, the difficulty of finding work kept the child at home. In
61 per cent
10 per cent
29 per cent
Employment
Poor Results or Disinterest
Financial Problems of Family
Figure 2: Reasons for Non-Enrolment or Dropout – Percentage
Table 5: Enrolment Ratios and Average Number of Dropouts
by Slums
Item Slum1 Slum2 Slum3 Slum4 Slum5 All
Enrolment Ratio 0.98 0.84 0.90 0.75 0.67 0.82
Average Dropout per HH 0.05 0.59 0.20 1.08 1.13 0.68
Table 6: Number of Child Labourers and Income in each Slum
Slums Income from Per Cent of Number of Dropouts
Child Labour Income from Dropouts as Per Cent
(Rs)   Child Labour   of Children
Slum 1 - - 1 3.03
Slum 2 1000 46.49 10 21.74
Slum 3 1500 73.53 3 12.50
Slum 4 990.91 47.22 28 33.73
Slum 5 614.29 31.15 27 38.03
All 890.48 44.05 69 26.85
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most cases, therefore, there appears to be a time lag of as much
as 2-3 years before the child gets work. In some households it
was found that the child was being trained without any daily
wages. This evidence supports the assertion that child labour is
often a ‘default activity’, and not due to high opportunity cost.
Children were employed in the factories or in motor repairing
shops. In several cases, particularly in the Dhapapara area, the
child may be employed in cutting rubber straps at home. This
work fetches a wage of 50 paisa per two dozen for the plastic
straps, and 78 paisa per two dozen for the better quality straps.
In Gorachand Road, on the other hand, boys work in the house-
hold shoe units, and girls remain at home doing needlework on
‘jari’ sarees. Such income fetched Rs 890.48 per month, about
43.04 per cent of monthly income.
The income earned by child workers – in absolute terms and
as percentage of income – is higher in the medium income slums
which have greater access to more organised informal units.
However, the incidence of dropouts is lower in these slums. The
reason is that work like cutting rubber straps can be undertaken
at home after school hours. This enables children to combine
schooling with income earning activities. This enables the family
to raise the necessary finances to educate their children. In three
households (in Slum 4) it was found that while economic cir-
cumstances forced the child to join factories where working hours
are rigid, the children tried to obtain education through private
lessons from neighbours.
Household Duties of Children
Another possible reason for the high opportunity cost of
education is that children may have to perform household duties.
Among such chores are supervising siblings (especially during
child-bearing by their mother), helping in cooking, washing
clothes and utensils, marketing, etc. In the absence of extended
families, it may be not be possible for the mother to perform
all these tasks herself – especially if she has to work. In such
cases children have to supplement the labour provided by their
mother in these tasks. This may prevent them from joining school
or attending school on a regular basis.
Field studies have questioned these propositions. Firstly, at the
primary stage, children are often too young to assume respon-
sibilities of others – at most they assist adult members in various
chores. Secondly, household chores do not always conflict with
school hours but can be performed after school is over. As a
result, children do help adult members in household tasks, but
do not spend much time in such activities.22 Bhatty (1998) cites
a study estimating that 20 per cent of the boys and 26 per cent
of the girls did not go to school or do any work; 60 per cent of
the boys and 43 per cent of the girls did not perform any household
chores.23 However, there appears to be a gender bias in this regard.
As part of her training to become the caregiver, girls frequently
have to undertake more chores and work for longer hours.24
This study did not find any major conflict between schooling
and household chores. In one case in Dhapapara slum, the chronic
sickness of the mother led to the withdrawal of a girl to assume
household responsibilities. In several cases adolescent girls were
found to have been withdrawn from school to help her mother
in household tasks. In these cases, the parents were planning her
marriage and this move can be interpreted as training her for
her new role in her matrimonial home. It also enabled the family
to divert the funds released from her schooling to other children.
During surveys, most of the children were observed to be
engaged in leisure activities – playing or reading or gossiping.
Boys performed light tasks like buying groceries that took them
outside their homes; girls assumed more responsibilities, all of
which was centred round their house. They helped in cooking,
washing clothes, and looking after babies. However, such tasks
were generally not routinely performed, but were undertaken on
holidays or after school hours and did not consume much time.
VII
An Econometric Analysis
Finally, an econometric analysis of the demand for education
has been attempted. The total expenditure on education (ECOST),
expenditure per child (PCEC) and the enrolment ratio (ERATIO)
has been successively regressed on the following independent
variables using the ordinary least square (OLS) method:
(a) Slums: We have seen that education-related decisions vary
across slums, though the difference between Slums 2, 3 and 4 are
not marked. In the regression models dummy variables have been
used for Slums 1, 2, 4 and 5 – enabling us to test whether behaviour
in each of these slums is significantly different from that in Slum 3.
(b) Income: We would expect demand for education to increase
with income. We have used either family income (INCOME),
or per capita (PCY).
(c) Opportunity cost: The opportunity cost (OCOST) of education
also affects demand for education. The higher the opportunity
cost of labour, the lower will be demand for education.
(d) Number of school-going children: The greater the number
of school-going children (SGC) the higher would be the budget
on education. On the other hand, the per capita expenditure on
education can be expected to fall with a higher number of school-
going children. This variable is dropped in the equation for
ERATIO.
(e) Gender bias: Empirical studies have stressed on the presence
of a gender bias in education-related decisions. Girls are generally
not enrolled; expenditure on girls are lower than for boys. So
it would expect that demand for education would fall, the higher
is the ratio of girls to total children (SRATIO). The effect of
this variable can be expected to be significant for per capita
education cost (PEC) and the enrolment ratio (ERATIO).
Results of OLS Regression
The results of the three regressions are given below. The figures
in parentheses are t-ratios.
ECOST = 255.92 + 293.57 SLUM1 – 23.72 SLUM2 – 13.44 SLUM4
(3.022) (3.395)  (-0.767) (-0.160)
– 313.83 SLUM5
 (-3.377)
+ 0.15 PCY – 0.160 OCOST – 51.32 SRATIO + 42.94 SGC
(2.395) (-2.779) (-0.824) (1.991)
R2 = 0.530 adj R2 = 0.490 F = 13.13 n = 102 df = 93
Table 7: Values of Test Statistics for Langrange Multiplier
and Hausman
Model LM Statistic Probability Hausman Probability
Statistic
ECOST 130.70 0.000000 1.19 0.879891
PCEC 19.88 0.000008 2.08 0.720347
ERATIO 12.18 .000483 3.16 0.366993
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PCEC = 150.98 + 178.04 SLUM1 – 97.25 SLUM2 – 71.00SLUM4
(2.193) (3.051) (-1.641) (-1.270)
– 155.45 SLUM5
  (-2.606)
+ 0.076 INCOME – 0.11 OCOST – 31.05 SRATIO – 44.93 SGC
(4.545) (-2.938) (-0.746) (-3.091)
R2 = 0.63 adj R2 = 0.60 F = 19.78 n = 102 df = 93
ERATIO = 0.93 + 0.02 SLUM1 – 0.07 SLUM2 – 0.03 SLUM4 – 0.23 SLUM5
(9.48) (0.253) (-0.844) (-0.359) (-2.665)
– 0.000006 INCOME – 0.00004 OCOST + 0.09 SRATIO
 (-0.269) (7.558) (1.513)
R2 = 0.48 adj R2 = 0.44 F = 12.49 n = 102 df = 93
These results indicate that there are significant differences
between Slums 1, 3 and 5. Slums 2, 3 and 4 are, however, similar,
and the coefficients of SLUM2 and SLUM4 are not significantly
different from 0. Note that the t-ratio of SLUM1 is statistically
insignificant for ERATIO. This means that families try to enrol
their children irrespective of their background. In this context,
it should also be noted that it is only for ERATIO that Income
is statistically insignificant – in all other cases, it is positively
related to education demand. Similarly, opportunity cost
exercises a significant influence on education demand. As
expected, the sign is negative. However, this has to be interpreted
cautiously in view of our interpretation of child labour as a default
activity. The regression model does not identify the direction of
causality between OCOST and education decisions – only the
presence of a statistically significant relationship between them.
The ratio of girls to total children, however, is not significant
in any of the three cases. This can be interpreted as an absence
of any gender bias in education-related decisions. The coefficient
of the number of school-going children (SGC) also has the
anticipated sign.
Fixed Effect vs Random Effect Model
The discussion on education decisions indicates that there are
significant inter-slum differences. In the previous sub-section,
these differences are conceptualised as follows:
yij = αi + βijX + εij
when i denotes the slums and j the observations for each slum.
The regressors in X are OCOST, Income (PCY), SGC and
ERATIO, while the intercept is not included in the matrix X.
The individual affect is αi, which is assumed to be constant across
individual observations and specific to each slum. Recent re-
search on panel data shows that this model can be generalised
using two basic frameworks. The fixed effects approach assumes
αI to be a group-specific constant term in the regression model.
This model is appropriate if the differences between slums can
be viewed as parametric shifts of the regression function. The
random effects approach, on the other hand, assumes that αi is
a group specific disturbance term, similar to εij, except that for
each group, there is only one draw that enters the regression
identically for each slum. The above model would then have to
be reformulated as:
yij = αi + βijX + u i + εij
The component ui characterises the slum i and is constant for
all households j in the slum.
To test which model is applied we have to first consider
the validity of the constant term model using the Langrange
Multiplier test; if this model is rejected, then the Hausman Test
is used to test the appropriateness of the fixed effects and random
effects models. The results of these tests have been reported in
the appendix. We briefly sum up the implications of the results
obtained in this section.
For all three dependent variables – ECOST, PCEC and ERATIO
– the Langrange Multiplier test statistic is very high indicating
that the slum effects are statistically significant. Hence the constant
term classical regression model is inappropriate. The Hausman
test statistic indicates that the random effects model is appro-
priate. This implies that the hypothesis that slum effects are
uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model cannot be
rejected.
ANNEX
Model 1: ECOST as Dependent Variable
Estimates: Var[e] = .599120D+05
Var[u] = .152320D+06
Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)] = .717705
Reestimated using GLS coefficients:
Estimates: Var[e] = .599135D+05
Var[u] = .181702D+06
Sum of Squares .961601D+07
R-squared .189593D+00
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St Er P[|Z|>z] Mean of X
PCY .1567260678 .64258383E-01 2.439 .0147 528.75637
OCOST -.1563243774 .55892388E-01 -2.797 .0052 183.33333
SGC 42.73898918 21.548302 1.983 .0473 1.8431373
SRATIO -50.95435639 62.219539 -.819 .4128 .43000000
Constant 243.1422531 187.39823 1.297 .1945
Model 2: PCEC as Dependent Variable
Estimates: Var[e] = .266113D+05
Var[u] = .298121D+05
Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)] = .528364
Reestimated using GLS coefficients:
Estimates: Var[e] = .266230D+05
Var[u] = .623937D+05
Sum of Squares .379897D+07
R-squared .431702D+00
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St Er P[|Z|>z] Mean of X
INCOME .7957861273E-01 .16645178E-01 4.781 .0000 2865.9412
OCOST -.1105170259 .36962792E-01 -2.990 .0028 183.33333
SGC -46.28656952 14.494894 -3.193 .0014 1.8431373
SRATIO -29.64022729 41.544414 -.713 .4756 .43000000
Constant 114.5030350 96.169379 1.191 .2338
Model 3: ERATIO as Dependent Variable
Estimates: Var[e] = .539700D-01
Var[u] = .786502D-02
Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)] = .127194
Reestimated using GLS coefficients:
Estimates: Var[e] = .540122D-01
Var[u] = .395001D-01
Sum of Squares .600700D+01
R-squared .403176D+00
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St Er P[|Z|>z] Mean of X
PCY -.8417221825E-04 .59431645E-04 -1.416 .1567 528.75637
OCOST -.4072967673E-03 .51314607E-04 -7.937 .0000 183.33333
SRATIO .8349352793E-01 .58282917E-01 1.433 .1520 .43000000
Constant .9041377646 .63301210E-01 14.283 .0000
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The economic interpretation of these tests is that there are
significant inter-slum variations in education related behaviour.
However, these differences are random in nature and not related
to the independent variables like opportunity costs of education,
income, etc. This implies the possibility that socio-cultural
differences across slums may have been important forces creating
differences in education related behaviour and underlines the
need to expand the survey to other slums and identify the precise
socio-cultural factors that are relevant in explaining the behaviour
of households in each slum.
Conclusions
The starting point of this paper was the proposition – commonly
put forward by researchers and supported by case studies – that
literacy level of Muslims, particularly in low-income households,
are low. This phenomenon is explained in terms of the values
prevalent within the Muslim community. As a result dropouts
and non-enrolment is high in Muslim households, there is an
in-built resistance to educating daughters and the madrasa is the
common vehicle of education. This survey, despite its tentative
nature, questions the validity of these propositions.
The view that Muslims reject the value of education is not
supported in the survey findings – respondents argued that
education was important for both boys and girls. Thus, the value
theory cannot be accepted as an explanation of the low levels
of education. The motivations underlying choice of education
provide an indication of the valid explanation. Studies of factors
motivating education demand in rural and urban India emphasise
on the economic returns from education. In this study, economic
motivations do not appear to be significant, implying that the
perceived returns from education are different between Muslims
and non-Muslims. This can be expected to create a different
pattern of education demand within the Muslim community.
This study indicates that parents believe that ‘education’ is
important as it helps an individual in his daily life. It is needed
by male members to undertake various transactions and enter into
different contracts. Knowledge of writing, reading and simple
arithmetic skills is necessary to undertake such activities without
depending on others. This creates a demand for literacy that can
be satisfied by primary education. Education, however, is a
broader process and includes higher levels of learning. It is
necessary for the efficient performance of activities that are
normally not undertaken by slum dwellers. Since Muslims perceive
a bias against themselves in the labour market, boys become
disinterested in further education. Their greater mobility is
important in this context. The absence of restrictions on their
movement means that they have more alternatives to remaining
at school – watching movies, playing football, roaming about
in the city. They also seek work in the informal job market. Note
again that they are not leaving school because they have found
work – rather, they seek work because they have left their school.
In such cases, the replacement of formal education at the sec-
ondary level by vocational training courses may be a relevant
option before policy-makers. Such courses will prepare the Muslim
boys to be self-employed and may counter-act the economic
disincentives to seeking education.
In the case of girls, there is a different process at work. The
role played by the mother in supervising education of children
has been emphasised in this study. A more educated woman is
more likely to perform this task efficiently. Simultaneously, in
cases of desertion, education helps the mother to support her
family. This leads parents to educate girls. After adolescence is
reached, restrictions are imposed on movements of the girl.
Ironically, this restriction may exercise a positive effect on her
education. Unlike her more mobile brother, the girl is restricted
to her immediate neighbourhood and to her nearby school. This
increases her focus and may lead to higher levels of attainment
for girls.25 At the same time, there is a conflict between providing
education and preparing the girl for her future domestic role.
However, this conflict manifests itself not at the primary stage
– but in the secondary stage. Eventually, it leads to the withdrawal
of the girl from schooling. In most cases, she is married off at
the age of 16 years;26 in others, she assumes greater responsibility
at home to prepare for her future role. It is difficult to suggest
any suitable policy intervention to address this problem. Obvi-
ously, any intervention must be at the social level – directed
towards increasing the age of marriage through legislation27 and
through social movements, and in drawing Muslim women away
from the household domain into the external world.
Discussions with respondents and guides revealed there is
another factor at work, operating for both sexes that reduces the
survival rate at the secondary level. Given the low income of
slum dwellers, the funds allotted to education are scarce. Al-
though, this budget increases with the number of school-going
children, the per capita expenditure falls (see first two regression
results).28 This implies that children compete between them-
selves for scarce funds. Given the pessimistic attitude towards
the relationship between education and employment, it is only
natural for Muslim parents to divert these funds from a child
who has already achieved the minimum education considered
necessary and reallocate it towards a younger child who has just
started schooling.
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Kaushar Hossain, Anwar Ali, Jani Khan, members of Beniapukur Young
Star Club (particularly Abid Hussain), and Kaushik Bar and Anwara Khatun
(both of World Vision) for their assistance during the survey.]
1 S Keller and M Zavalloni (1962), ‘Classe sociale, ambition et réussite’,
Sociolgie du Travail, 4, pp 1-14.
Ibid (1964), ‘Ambition and Social Class: A Respecefication’, Social
Forces, 43, pp 38-70, Cited, Boudon (1978).
2 One respondent worked for the Calcutta Tramways; several other
inhabitants were engaged in private offices or in schools.
3 Unfortunately, children of our respondents do not perform as well in
the educational arena as British working class children. This is because
of high costs of education, absence of infrastructural support and pessimism
regarding possible job openings.
4 The Times of India, August 15, 1997 and The Indian Express, August
15, 1997, respectively. Cited in PROBE TEAM (1999), p 14.
5 Only 5.88 per cent felt that daughters should not be educated.
6 So long as lack of education of the groom is compensated by other
characteristics like high income, secure job, etc.
Number of school-going children
7 The enrolment rate is defined as: —————————————   * 100
Total number of children in family
8 While these explanations are from Banerjee (1997) teachers in the survey
areas expressed the same opinion.

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9 Before the NGO schools started opertaion in the Topsia area, most of
the children use to work as child labourers in the nearby leather and
shoe factories. They worked for as long as 10-12 hours every day packing
and carrying materials, etc, for daily wages of Rs 20-25. Secondly, most
of the mothers also worked – either to supplement family income, or,
in the case of desertion by her husband, as the main bread earner. In
such cases, girls had to perform many household tasks, like cooking,
washing, looking after siblings, etc.
10 Both parents played a role in 8.60 per cent of the families – that is, in
68.82 families the mother had a role in education of the children. This
is in contrast to 26.88 per cent families, where only the father took
educational decisions.
11 The mother may be working in a distant place or in a job with long
and fixed hours. In many cases, desertion by her husband may mean
that she has to take the responsibilities of her husband. In such cases
also her working hours will coincide with that of a male worker.
12 During our visits to one of these schools, the supply of water through
a water filter also seemed to be a source of attraction to the children!
13 An interesting trend was observed when information was sought on the
literacy levels of parents. Almost all parents could read Urdu/Arabic as
a result of having been imparted religious instructions in their childhood.
The normal progression is the Kaida, Amsi-para and, finally, the Koran
and Hadith. However, all parents claimed that that they were illiterates!
It was only when they were reassured of the religious identity of the
researcher by the guide that they reported the above. This raises the
interesting possibility that NSS or census estimates of literacy amongst
Muslims may be underreported. This study also indicates that it may
be the nature of literacy is changing over time (with the present generation
being educated in both Arabic, and Bengali, Urdu and English, compared
to their parents who were literate in only Arabic), rather than an increase
in the literacy rates per se. Alternately, we can argue that functional
literacy is increasing amongst Muslims, as Arabic is not a functional
language. However, these are tentative hypotheses as they cannot be
tested in the absence of NSS data on literacy amongst Muslims. NSS
data does exist, but the figures are for Muslims across all income groups
–not for Muslim slum dwellers exclusively.
14 We have tested for difference using the Mann-Whitney U test and
Kolmogurov-Smirnov Z tests.
15 Assuming that a slum dweller works as a daily maidservant (thike) for
Rs 300 per month, the monetary equivalent of this time cost is about
Rs 100 per month.
16 M Gupta and K Voll (1999), ‘Child Labour in India: An Exemplary Case
Study’ in K Voll (ed), Against Child Labour: Indian and International
Dimensions and Strategies, Mosaic Books and Third Millennium
Transparency, New Delhi, cited, Subrahmaniam (2002).
17 U Grote, A Basu and D Weinhold (1998), ‘Child Labour and the
International Policy Debate: The Education/Child Labour Trade-Off and
the Consequences of Trade Sanctions’, ZEF Discussion Papers on
Development Policy, Bonn, cited in Subrahmaniam (2002).
18 Ibid.
19 M Gupta and K Voll (1999), ‘Child Labour in India: An Exemplary Case
Study’ in K Voll (ed), Against Child Labour: Indian and International
Dimensions and Strategies, Mosaic Books and Third Millennium
Transparency, New Delhi, cited in Subrahmaniam (2002).
20 Mehrotra  (1995), on the other hand, argues that dropouts occur at an
early stage before the children are capable of joining the workforce, cited
in Bhatty (1998).
N Mehrotra (1995), Why Poor Children Do Not Attend Schools,
Department of Education, University of Chicago, cited in Bhatty (1998).
21 O Niewenhuys (1994), ‘Children’s Lifeworlds: Gender, Welfare and
Labour in the Developing World’, Routledge, London and New York,
cited in Subrahmaniam (2002).
22 S Jeejbhoy and S Kulkarni (1998), ‘Demand for Children and Reproductive
Motivation: Emperical observations from Rural Maharashtra’ in S N
Singh et al (eds), Population Transition in India, BR Publishers, New
Delhi, cited in Bhatty (1998).
23 B M Dinesh (1988), ‘Economic Activities of Children: Dimensions,
Causes and Consequences’, Dayal Publishers, New Delhi.
24 Bhatty (1998) cites an unspecified study by Bashir (1994) that found
in urban Tamil Nadu that girls work three times more than boys in urban
areas. On an average, children spent 1-2 hours in household work.
25 Our focus on primary education prevented us from studying this aspect.
In a few cases we did find higher levels of attainment by girls, particularly
in Slum 1. However, our data is not systematic enough to arrive at any
firm conclusion.
26 Early marriage has been identified by many researchers as the most important
constraint to female education [Karlekar 2000; Sudarshan 2000].
27 The current minimum age of marriage of Muslim girls is 14 years.
28 If we regress ECOST on SGC and SGC2, we get the following results:
ECOST = 139.42 + 195.69 SGC – 32.58 SGC2
    (1.675)    (2.790)          (-2.559)
R2 = 0.05; adj. R2 = 0.05; F= 3.89; d.f. = 99; n = 102.
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. The positive sign of SGC and the
negative sign of SGC2 imply that the curve is positively sloped, but
concave from below – so that ECOST will increase with SGC, but at
a diminishing rate.
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